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CORPORATE AND STATE MINING LEGITIMATED: TRANSFERRING FUTURE 





The responsibility for pollution resulting from mining, according to the OECD’s Polluter 
Pays Principle (PPP) rests with the owners of the mining entity. This principle relies on a 
number of legislative instruments and often a mix of command and control mechanisms are 
advocated. The case of the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea is used to demonstrate that 
this mix raises conflicts and paradoxes for the shareholders and the regulator. The discourse 
of ‘future economic benefits’ was used by both the Australian company, BHP Billiton and the 
PNG Government, whilst responsibility and liabilities were shifted between them. This 
accounting terminology served to mediate the use of legislative instruments which conferred 
institutional legitimacy to the transfer of responsibility.  In this case, “passing the buck” is 
constructed as legal and rational thus legitimating the conduct of both the corporation and the 




KEY WORDS: accounting discourse, future economic benefits, legal instruments, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) advocates that “the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out 
… measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable 
state” (OECD, 2001, p 16).  The PPP was developed in the early 1970’s as governments tried 
to control pollution by introducing a number of regulations, which could be implemented 
through taxation systems and/or liability regimes (Milne 2003). The trend for government 
regulation seemed to give way to “co-regulation of mining, involving an appropriate mix of 
command and control regulation, incentives and penalties” (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2000, p 142).  In order to better understand the implications of this command and control we 
have chosen to consider the roles of legislative instruments and accounting discourse in 
applying, even notionally, the PPP.  We demonstrate how the legislative instruments and 
contemporary account ing terminology, legitimated the actions of both the regulator and the 
shareholder.  In this way, the mix of command and control, as played out by the company and 
the State, demonstrates the potential to compromise the regulator and blur the lines of 
responsibility.  
 
The Australian mining industry also recognises that the polluter pays principle “applies” 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000, p 142) to Australian companies with operations in 
other countries. If we expect Australian companies in Australia to uphold the codes of 
conduct with respect to environmental responsibility then might we expect the same of an 
Australian multinational company, such as BHP Billiton1 involved in mining in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG)?  Whether the OECD has jurisdiction over PNG is not the point of the paper, 
rather, we focus on whether the principle of responsibility for pollution implied in PPP was 
upheld, even notionally.  
 
The case of the Ok Tedi mine site in PNG may have many lessons for other mining activities 
in the Asia Pacific, especially since the Asia Pacific has been experiencing significantly 
increased mining activity (Harris 1997). In brief, this case plays out the impact of a 
multinational company BHP Ltd and the PNG Government, both having part ownership of 
the Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) company.   
 
PNG did have a number of instruments which were in place which could have prevented or 
minimized the negative environmental effects of mining. The PNG Government did put in 
place legislation and other instruments to facilitate the development of the mine and even put 
in place supplementary agreements to the Mining Act (Ok Tedi 2001a) which, in effect, 
allowed large volumes of waste from the mine to be discharged into the river system. In 
addition, further agreements released BHP of future liabilities and enabled it to exit PNG. 
Both the company, BHP, and the State, the PNG government, argued that future economic 
benefits were also transferred when share ownership was transferred.  
 
We use publically available documents such as BHP Billiton annual reports, published 
speeches at annual general meetings and PNG Government parliamentary readings to explore 
their use of discourse. We engage the theoretical analysis of legitimation to better understand 
how accounting terminology and legal structures played a role in BHP exiting PNG and how, 
from its perspective, it was released of any future liabilities resulting from their past mining 
                                                 
1 BHP Ltd with headquarters in Melbourne Australia (hereafter referred to as BHP) merged in 2001 with 
Billiton PLC with headquarters in London UK to become the BHP Billiton Group (hereafter referred to as BHP 
Billiton) with its headquarters in Melbourne Australia (as per the BHP Billiton, 2004 website). 
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activities in PNG.  Why is it that contemporary accounting terminology assuaged the 
implementation of legislative instruments which allowed the polluter to “pass the buck”?   
 
We note that in this paper we seek to explain what “often appears as common sense … taken 
for granted world” (Turkel, 1980, p 8).  The transfer of ownership of shares also meant the 
transfer of liabilities and this is tied to the concept of limited liability. It is taken for granted 
that the point of the company legal structures is to limit the liability of shareholders.  This is 
one of modernity’s profound contributions to society. According to the discourse of 
modernity, rationality is couched in technical language (Luke, 1990). In this way there is “no 
incompatibility between the corporate quest for efficiency” and “the interests of other social 
constituencies” (Neimark, 1995, p 30).  In this case, the interests of other social 
constituencies such as the families and clans of the Upper Middle Fly Villages may not fall 
neatly within the ambit of economic discourse.   
 
DISCOURSE AND INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF LEGITIMATION 
 
We consider the role of accounting discourse and build on the notion that accounting as 
rhetoric is “institutionally grounded” (Miller, 1994, p 21). We demonstrate that accounting 
discourse is effective as rhetoric when it is supported by legal instruments such as acts of 
parliament.  We draw on the theory of legitimation referred to as “that constellation of 
reasons and beliefs which social members willingly affirm in their support of the social 
order” (Turkel, 1980, p 8).  The social order as constructed and reflected by the State and in 
providers of capital is central to this paper. Specifically, we are considering the PNG 
Government and the corporate forms of BHP; a multinational company (Evans et al, 2001), 
their mining activities and the resultant environmental pollution in PNG. 
 
Turkel (1982) conceptualised corporate legitimacy as having two elements involving 
discourse and institutions. The discursive element in this paper focuses on contemporary 
accounting terminology, particularly the term “future economic benefit”. We explore how 
this legitimating discourse “renders justifiable” (Turkel, 1982, p 186) corporate behaviour, 
which might otherwise be considered as irresponsible.  The institutional element is 
represented by the legal system and its related instruments which enable the exercise of 
power (Turkel, 1982).  We demonstrate how the State invoked the concepts of future 
economic benefits to rationalise the effect of legislation.  The legislation supported both the 
conduct of the corporation and the State.  
 
It is important to stress that the discourse and the institutional elements are mutually 
reinforcing which enables legitimation to have the authority of consensual process (Turkel, 
1980, 1982). It is this mutually reinforcing aspect which is taken for granted and to which we 
draw attention.  Before we discuss the legitimating elements in this case, we need to present a 
brief background to the Ok Tedi mine in PNG. 
 
THE OK TEDI MINE SITE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
The Ok Tedi mine site is found on Mount Fubilan in the Star Mountains of the Western 
Province of PNG (Van Zyl et al, 2002b). The river system includes the Ok Tedi River and the 
Fly River which eventually reaches the sea some 846km downstream (Van Zyl et al, 2002b). 
The copper mineralisation was first noted in 1963 by a government patrol leader.  Eventually 
after 8 years or so of development, gold was produced in 1984 and copper production in 1987 
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(Ok Tedi Mining Limited, 2001b).  This was after a first stage investment totalling US$1 
billion (Malik, 1988). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A significant characteristic of the region of the mine is the frequency of landslides due to 
high torrential rainfall, as well as, earth tremors and earthquakes. Early attempts in 1984 (see 
table 1) to build a tailings dam were thwarted by massive landslides (Van Zyl et al, 2002b).  
According to geological and engineering reviews, building a tailings dam was “not 
practicable” (Anonymous, 1994, p 9). This resulted in an “average of 90 million tonnes of 
tailings, overburden and mine induced erosion discharged to the Ok Tedi [river system] each 
year” (Ok Tedi Mining, 2001c, p 1). According to peer reviewed science, this aggradation 
was expected to result in 1,350 square kilometres of forest dieback (BHP, 1999). These 
“forests are expected to take many years to recover after the mine closure” (Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited 2001c, p 1-2).  The Ok Tedi gold and copper mine in PNG has had “serious 
implications for everyone involved” (BHP, 1999, p 2).  There were significant, long lasting 
and extensive environmental consequences of the Ok Tedi mining activities.  Whether these 
consequences are ascribed as responsibilities and/or liabilities and to whom, are important 
issues. Accordingly we focus on the effect of economic benefits becoming the dominant 
discourse.  
 
ECONOMIC BENEFITS: LEGITIMATING DISCOURSE 
 
The financial returns for “PNG and the Western Province Governments and the local 
landowners have been substantial” (BHP, 1999, p 10). The economic benefit to PNG was so 
significant that it represented “more than 10% of the nation’s GDP” (BHP, 1999, p 10). Ok 
Tedi contributed to PNG’s total export revenues having markets in Asia and Europe (Ok Tedi 
Mining Limited 2001c).  Total taxes and royalties amounted to 505.6 million kina, which 
included company tax of 91.8 million kina (BHP, 1999, p 10). As well as royalties and taxes, 
OTML had constructed and maintained “national infrastructure like roads, wharves and 
airports” as well as contributing to “workforce training” and supporting “primary and 
secondary education … medical and hospital facilities” (BHP, 1999, p 10). 
 
BHP Billiton made the point that it would have preferred early closure of the Ok Tedi mine, 
in order to minimise the extent of the environmental damage (BHP 1999, BHP Billiton 
2003), but was unable to achieve this. It seems that BHP Billiton’s “equity position did not 
give [it] effective control of OTML” (BHP Billiton 2003) even though at the time, it had 52% 
of the shareholdings.  The PNG Government (also a shareholder of OTML) was opposed to 
early mine closure (Porter, 2001). The Minister of Mining stressed that “BHP Billiton’s exit 
from the Ok Tedi mine as, the major shareholder and the operator of the Ok Tedi mine would 
have major implications on PNG” (Haivetta, 2001, p 2).  This raises the issue of control and 
the role of negotiation, which is discussed later.  
 
By 8 February 2002 BHP Billiton divested its 52% shareholding in OTML with equity 
transferred to PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd referred to as the Program 
Company (see Table 1) (Ok Tedi Mining Limited 2001a).  The Program Company is an 
offshore company based in Singapore (Porter, 2001) and has the role of funding “sustainable 
development projects in PNG” (Porter, 2001, p 2). Accordingly, dividends are expected to 
accrue to the Western Province of PNG (Ok Tedi Mining  Limited, 2001a, p1). It was 
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stressed in parliament, by the Minister of Mining, that “(u)nder the new arrangements these 
benefits will increase to about K65-70 million per annum” (Haivetta, 2001, p 4).  
 
The Minister of Mining of PNG at the time, argued the case of the continuation of the Ok 
Tedi mine during his reading to the PNG Parliament for the Mining Bill (and its ninth 
supplemental agreement).  The Minister was keen to point out that, although there were 
negative environmental impacts 
 
the Ok Tedi mine has and continues to have a significant beneficial impact 
on affected landowner communities of the Western Province in terms of 
development activities and the Western Province and the national economy 
through taxes and dividends and royalty payments (Haivetta, 2001, p 1).  
 
BHP and its successor BHP Billiton have continued to contribute financially to PNG and 
“full cash provisioning is being implemented by OTML’s shareholders to provide for mine 
closure” (BHP Billiton, 2003, p1) which is expected to take place by the year 2010 “when 
readily accessible ore is exhausted” (Ok Tedi Mining Limited 2001c, p 1-2). According to 
both the State and the participating companies, there were economic benefits for PNG.  
However, there were no longer economic benefits for BHP Billiton. 
 
NO BENEFITS, NO LIABILITIES: MORE LEGITIMATING DISCOURSE 
 
In BHP’s 2001 Annual General Meeting it was put that their activities in PNG no longer 
provided a financial benefit. The financial returns for OTML and BHP had “not provided an 
acceptable direct financial return to its private shareholders” (BHP, 1999, p 10).  The 
Chairman of BHP Billiton explained that “as we will have no future financial benefits 
coming from the mine’s operations, the agreement will also provide protection for us against 
future liabilities” (Porter, 2001, p 1).  This agreement linked responsibility directly to 
financial benefits only accruing in the future and not responsibility resulting from past events 
and transactions.  In any case, BHP would only have access to OTML financial returns by 
remaining as a shareholder. BHP’s decision to divest itself of its OTML shares was a pivotal 
decision for BHP and the PNG Government. The discourse featured the term ‘future 
economic benefits’ so that their arguments were presented as rational and unproblematic.  
The use of the abstract notion of future economic benefits not only reveals an emphasis on 
the future but also resists any backward glance. By implication, the reference to future 
benefits distracts and in effect decouples past transactions and events to future 
responsibilities and liabilities.   
 
Indeed the “notion of assets as future economic benefits is completely at odds with the 
recording of assets at historical cost” (Williams, 2003, p 160).  Instead the concept of an asset 
as a resource, or a right or an object or a deferred cost was taken over (in generally accepted 
accounting principles) by the notion that an asset has probable future economic benefits 
(Williams 2003). Importantly, these future economic benefits are either owned or controlled 
by an entity as a result of past transactions and events (Williams, 2003). Never the less, BHP 
was able to claim that as it no longer had future economic benefits (having divested its shares 
in OTML) it followed that it no longer had a liability.   
 
It is worth noting that in generally accepted accounting principles, assets and liabilities result 
from past transactions or other past events.  It is also worth noting that the future and indeed 
past liabilities were not a surprise to BHP. In the case of Ok Tedi, there was a range of 
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stakeholders, including the “6,000 villagers (who) launched a $4 billion claim against BHP 
and Ok Tedi as compensation for environmental damages resulting from the Ok Tedi copper 
mine” (Anonymous, 1994, p 9).  There was a reference to the Ok Tedi writs in the notes to 
the accounts of the BHP financial reports to shareholders in 1994. However, under the 
heading of ‘contingent liabilities’ the following was stated: 
 
(w)hilst liability (if any) of the defendants in relation to these proceedings 
cannot be quantified it is not expected that the outcome of these 
proceedings will have a material adverse effect on the BHP group (BHP, 
1994, p 24).   
 
It is also interesting to note that BHP had acquired more shares in OTML, described as 
“(b)eneficial interest in ordinary shares (having) increased to 60% from 30% and in 
preference shares increased to 69.4% from 34.7%” (BHP, 1994, p 24). The fair value of net  
tangible assets acquired of this controlled entity was AUD184.8 million (BHP, 1994).  
However, when BHP exited PNG in 2002, OTML did not represent a future economic 
benefit, although the continuation of the mine did represent future economic benefits to PNG.  
That is, for future economic reasons it was rational for BHP Billiton to exit PNG and the 
same mining operations would, paradoxically, give future economic benefits to PNG.   
 
This paradox has either been overlooked, or merely taken for granted. In any case, this use of 
the same terminology gave a shared communicative language for both parties.  This served as 
the basis of consensus. That is, the common discourse served as a linguistic device which can 
be distinguished from both excuses and justifications (Turkel, 1980) of behaviour of both the 
corporation and the State.  This kind of consensus masks any conflicts of interest. It can be 
argued that there is “a conflict of interest, where the government is both the shareholder and 
the regulator of the developers’ activities” (Taylor, 1997, p 12) and “is therefore at least in 
part responsible for the environmental damage caused in pursuit of profit” (Taylor, 1997, p 
24). In this case, the PNG Government had a 20% share of the original Ok Tedi Mine 
consortium, together with BHP having 30% (Malik 1988) therefore was also partly 
responsible for the environmental consequences of the Ok Tedi mine.  As a shareholder and 
regulator the PNG Government faced conflicts of interest (Lafitte, 1995). 
 
The consensus resulting from using shared rhetoric also masked power differentials between 
parties.  It can be argued that the PNG Government as a developing country  may be 
influenced by economic benefits (Van Zyl et al, 2002a, p 18) and may have had limited 
choices between economic development and environmental damage.  By contrast the large 
multinational corporations, such as BHP Billiton, “have the power to shape state policy” 
(Evans, et al, 2001, p xiii).  The effect of a legitimating discourse is that it narrows the 
discourse into a modernist technical rationality (Luke 1990).  Although both the corporation 
and the State referred to difficult and protracted negotiations, resolution was achieved.  
According to its Chairman, BHP Billiton has  
 
been working assiduously to exit in a way that minimises the costs to 
shareholders while meeting the social and environmental obligations you 
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The Minister of Mining, in the second reading speech to the PNG Government noted that  
 
the Government has been involved in difficult and meticulous negotiations 
on the terms and conditions of BHP Billiton’s exit which were acceptable to 
all the shareholders of the Ok Tedi Mining Limited (Haivetta, 2001, p 2).   
 
Both the corporation and the State did not explicitly address any power differentials.  Instead 
they both invoked economic arguments for their actions and this served as a legitimating 
discourse for both parties. In this way, these legitimating accounts “serve to bridge the 
inequality in authority relations” (Turkel 1980, p 25).  
 
However, this discourse alone was not sufficient to effect the transfer of responsibility but 
was facilitated by a range of legislative instruments. The decoupling of past transactions and 
future liabilities was enabled by the rhetoric of future economic benefits no longer accruing 
to BHP Billiton and were given effect by a series of legislative instruments. 
 
ACTS, AGREEMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS: INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMATION 
 
There were a number of legislative instruments which enabled the mine to be established, the 
tailings to be dumped, the exit of the original mining company and the continuation of the 
mine.  Of course, there are also long standing legal instruments which allow for the 
separation of ownership and responsibility as well as the transfer of share ownership.   
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The establishment of the mine and disposal of tailings specifically required an act and 
subsequent amendments (see Table 1 and Table 2). The development of ore deposits on 
Mount Fubilan were possible with the 1976 Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement ) Act. This act was 
modified with the Fifth and Sixth Supplemental Agreements (1986) which allowed the 
“deferral of the continuation of permanent waste retention facilities until 1990 … This meant 
that all the tailings … were discharged into the river system” (Van Zyl, 2002b, p H-8). The 
significance of this act is underscored by the fact that PNG did have environmental 
legislation in place. PNG adopted environmental and conservation policies by 1977 (after it 
became independent in 1975) as part of its constitution and included the Environmental 
Planning Act, Environmental Contaminants Act and the Water Resources Act (Taylor, 1997). 
Despite these early efforts to protect their environment the Ok Tedi mine was “exempted 
from the environmental requirements” (Taylor, 1997, p 21) of these acts.  
 
It had been noted by one resource analyst (Richard Rossiter of Macquarie Bank) that  
 
the liability issue (was) an extremely important issue and, obviously, the 
critical element in the negotiation in terms of BHP exiting the project 
(Fowler, 2000, p 14).   
 
It could be said that the separation of ownership and responsibility was inevitable given the 
taken-for-granted use of limited liability corporate structures. It was also made possible by 
specific legislative instruments. These included a “series of releases, indemnities and 
warranties, which protect BHP Billiton from legal liability for the period after its exit” 
(Porter, 2001, p 3). These instruments ensured that  BHP Billiton was “released from any 
legal action relating to the regulatory compliance by PNG Government” (Porter, 2001, p 4) as 
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reported to the BHP Billiton Annual General Meeting.  In other words, despite the rationality 
of the economic argument, that future economic benefits were being assigned to PNG, the 
legitimating discourse still relies on formal systems of authority.  Further, any subsequent 
argument about accountability or responsibility are rendered superfluous, since the 
corporation’s actions are not illegal. Instead, the corporation’s actions have authority, thus 
this institutional element seals the legitimation process.  
 
Although these legal instruments may have transferred ownership of shares the issue of 
control seems inconclusive.  The shares from BHP Billiton were divested to PNG Sustainable 
Development Program Ltd (otherwise referred to as the Program Company). The Minister of 
Mining of PNG assured that the “Program Company would be an independent entity with no 
connection to BHP Billiton or the State” (Haivetta, 2001, p 3). This assurance needs to be 
considered in the light of the board membership of the Program Company, especially when it 
has “seven independent directors with three appointed by each of BHP Billiton [sic]” (Porter, 
2001, p 3). Further, “(a)pproval of projects will require a majority of directors appointed by 
BHP Billiton and the PNG agencies” (Porter, 2001, p 3).  Approval of projects may imply 
some kind of control, although it may not amount to explicit financial benefit to BHP 
Billiton.  
 
In generally accepted accounting principles the term control “is the power to govern the 
financial and operating policies of an enterprise as to obtain benefits from its activities” 
(IASB, 2003, p 198).  Here it is asserted that neither the PNG Government, nor BHP had any 
influence or control over the Program Company.  According to this rhetoric, the future 
economic benefits accruing to the PNG Government are not directly or indirectly influenced 
by the corporation. The transfer of future economic benefits occurs from the corporation to 
the State without the presence of any undue influence or coercion. At the same time, any 
liabilities associated with economic benefits are no longer part of the corporation’s concerns.  
Therefore, the legislative instruments served to legitimate the actions of both the company 
and the State.   
 
In this case, the mix of discourse and legislative instruments allowed responsibility to be 
transferred.  BHP Billiton had transferred the benefits and had been released of legal 
obligations to rehabilitate the environmental pollution caused by the Ok Tedi mine activities. 
Whether this was a release of obligations or escaping them (Anonymous, 2001) the fact 
remains that the “Ok Tedi settlement in itself will not obviate the downstream environmental 
impact from the mine” (Murray and Williams, 1997, p 200).  Therefore the statement that 
“the social members willingly affirm in their support of the social order” (Turkel, 1980, p 8) 
can only be made about those social members who had influence over the legitimating 
process. The people of the Upper Middle Fly villages did not support the social order implied 
by this legitimation process. 
 
In an affidavit to the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, people from the Upper Middle Fly 
Villages, did not consider that the Community Mine Continuation Agreement was reflecting 
their interests. They noted that the agreement “is not about environment issue, it is about 
development” (Upper Middle Fly Villages et al, 2004, p 1). The legislative instruments 
privilege the economic discourse associated with development and makes rational the issues 
which legitimate the conduct of BHP and the State. The Villages recognise that  
 
BHP had to give the burden to Ok Tedi and National government and walk 
away and asked  
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(c)an Your Honour tell us who will be responsible for the environmental 
damage that has been caused? (Upper Middle Fly Villages et al, 2004, p 2).   
 
This paper does not have an answer to the Villagers’ question. It may be little comfort to 
explain to them how future economic benefits and corresponding legislation legitimated the 
conduct of the corporation and State since they already recognise that the agreement was all 
about development and not about the environmental damage.  What may be taken-for-granted 
rational discourse is not taken for granted by all and the consensus that this communicative 
language enables is between the corporation and the State.  The effect of this consensus is 
that it may mask the discontent and interests of other social constituencies.  Since the 
villagers had accessed a legal system, displayed by the affidavit to the Supreme Court of 
Victoria, Australia, one may argue that there are signs that the legitimating process may not 
be over. At least the voices of these social constituencies, the villagers, are not totally 
silenced.  Whether they redirect discourse to address the responsibility for rehabilitation of 
the environment is inconclusive.  For this to happen it would mean destabilising  modernists 
privilege of economic discourse in order for notions of accountability to be inclusive of the 




The discourse of future economic benefits was used by both the corporate entity, BHP 
Billiton and the State, PNG Government even though they took different actions.  The 
rationality of economic discourse distracts from the paradox of the claim that the corporation 
no longer had economic benefits from the Ok Tedi mine and therefore it was appropriate for 
BHP Billiton to exit PNG, yet, for PNG, there were future economic benefits for the Ok Tedi 
mine to remain operational.  Although there were power differentials between the 
multinational company and the developing country, the sharing of a common language 
enabled conferred consensus on their actions.  The discourse and the legislative instruments 
served as rational and legal devices for corporate polluters to transfer and distance themselves 
from responsibility.  The use of the terminology of contemporary accounting as a rational 
discourse served to facilitate the implementation of legislative instruments which supported 
corporate behaviour, which might otherwise be described as abdicating responsibility or 
conveniently “passing the buck”.  This case then challenges the potential for the PPP to ever 
be effective, especially if the trend for a mix of command and control is considered desirable 
and unproblematic. Rather, the potential conflict of interest of a regulator also being a 
shareholder can undermine the role of legislation giving the principle any clout.  The 
principle that the polluter pays needs to be more than a principle so that responsibilities are 
met and not merely transferred. 
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Table 1: History of Development of Ok Tedi mine (adapted from Ok Tedi Mining  
Limited 2001 a) 
YEAR  EVENT Legislative instrument 
1976 BHP and PNG Government enter 
negotiations 
Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act passed 
1980 PNG Government exercises its option 
to take up 20% shareholding of Ok 
Tedi Consortium 
Mining (Ok Tedi Supplemental Agreement) 
Act passed 
1981  Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) 
incorporated 
Mining lease granted to OTML 
1984 Massive landslides destroy foundations 
of tailings dam 
 
1987 BHP agrees to provide management 
services to OTML 
 
1993 OTML ownership restructured:  
BHP increases from 30% to 60% of 
OTML 
State of PNG takes up 20% of OTML 
 
1994 Ok Tedi/Fly River landowners sue 
OTML and BHP for environmental 
damages 
 
2001 BHP Ltd merged with Billiton PLC 
Ok Tedi Development Foundation 
launched 
Community Mine Continuation Agreements 
Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation [Ninth 
Supplemental] Agreement Act 2001 passed  
2002 BHP transferred equity to PNG 
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